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"I can go to Wal-Mart and get everything I need to cook a batch of meth."'
INTRODUCTION
Cold medicine is not just for colds anymore. In the last decade, cold
medicine has become the central ingredient in the domestic manufacture of
methamphetamine, an extraordinarily dangerous drug that has exploded in
2popularity across the United States. From its origins on the West Coast,
methamphetamine has spread to the rest of the country, where users have
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected May 2007. 1 would like to thank my
Note Editors, Christie Hammerle and Joel Flaxman, and the entire staff at the Michigan Law
Review. I would also like to thank Professors Kimberly Thomas and Samuel Gross at the University
of Michigan Law School, and former Assistant United States Attorney Ron DeWaard, now with
Vamum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett LLP. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Karla, and my
dog, Lily, neither of whom allowed me to concentrate for unnecessarily long periods of time.
1. Sheila McNulty, Needles and Haystacks, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at 16 (Magazine)
(quoting Aaron Tippet, a narcotics lieutenant in Jasper County, Texas).
2. David J. Jefferson, America's Most Dangerous Drug, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 41;
Mark Gillispie, Meth Epidemic Strikes Ohio, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 7, 2005, at Al.
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started manufacturing the drug for themselves in makeshift laboratories.3
The manufacturing process utilizes a variety of ingredients, all of which are
readily available at any local drug store or supermarket.4 Chief among these
ingredients is pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in many cold medi-
cines.' In response, retailers, state legislatures, and the federal government
have imposed purchasing restrictions on cold medicines containing pseu-
doephedrine.6
Law enforcement has also worked to combat the domestic manufacture
of methamphetamine. Recognizing the central role of pseudoephedrine in
the manufacturing process, law enforcement officials have begun monitor-
ing drug stores and supermarkets for suspicious purchases of cold
medicine. Upon observing such a purchase, law enforcement officials often
conduct an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, of the purchaser
or purchasers As a result, state and federal courts have been forced to ad-
dress the central question in such encounters: when is a purchase of cold
medicine suspicious enough to permit law enforcement to conduct an inves-
tigatory stop? Unsurprisingly, courts have reached a wide range of
inconsistent results in analyzing such a fact-specific wrinkle in their search-
and-seizure jurisprudence.9
This Note attempts to inject some clarity into courts' reasonable suspi-
cion calculus for cold medicine purchases. It argues that the key factor in
analyzing such purchases is whether the purchaser or purchasers appear to
be circumventing pseudoephedrine purchasing restrictions in order to obtain
inordinately large quantities of pseudoephedrine. Part I provides a general
background on the domestic manufacture of methamphetamine in small,
clandestine laboratories. Part II then examines the interplay between out-
ward innocence and reasonable suspicion under the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part III establishes a framework for
identifying purchasing strategies that methamphetamine manufacturers
commonly use to circumvent pseudoephedrine purchasing restrictions.
These types of pseudoephedrine purchases meet the threshold for reasonable
suspicion, despite some courts' decisions to the contrary.
3. Jefferson, supra note 2. For a state-by-state comparison of the increase in methampheta-
mine laboratory seizures between 1999 and 2004, see U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Maps
of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, http://www.dea.gov/concenmap-labseizures.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2007).
4. See McNulty, supra note 1.
5. See infra Part I; see also Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Re-
sponses to Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2508, 2511-12 (2006).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Compare State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 2004) (refusing to find reasonable
suspicion from two companions each purchasing three boxes of pseudoephedrine at a Meijer while
pretending not to know each other), with Barrett v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding reasonable suspicion under very similar circumstances as in Bulington, with the only differ-
ence being that the car's "passenger-side tires were on the fog line for thirty to fifty yards").
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I. THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
Although at least one-half of methamphetamine in the United States is
smuggled into the country,'° the remainder is produced domestically in
small, clandestine laboratories, where users have discovered that they can
manufacture their own methamphetamine simply and cheaply." Manufac-
turers easily obtain all chemicals and equipment from retail stores,' 2 and
recipes are widely available on the internet. These laboratories currently use
two methods to manufacture methamphetamine: 3 (1) the "Birch reduction
method," also known as the "Nazi method,'' 4 and (2) the "red phosphorus
method," or "red-P method."'5
10. Jefferson, supra note 2. Most of this smuggled methamphetamine is produced in "super
labs" in Mexico. Id. Thus, even if domestic pseudoephedrine regulations and sophisticated enforce-
ment efforts curb methamphetamine manufacturing, the flow of methamphetamine from Mexico
may increase to fulfill the U.S. demand for it. As one Oklahoma official acknowledged, "[Mexican
drug cartels] have always supplied marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. When we took away the local
meth lab, they simply added methamphetamine to the truck." Kate Zemike, Potent Mexican Meth
Floods in as States Curb Domestic Variety, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at Al. On the plus side, limit-
ing the domestic manufacture of methamphetamine helps control the multitude of problems
accompanying the laboratories. See infra note 13. To the extent methamphetamine is smuggled from
Mexico using the same channels as other illegal drugs, enforcement initiatives are already in place,
and law enforcement agencies are experienced at fighting this smuggling effort. Also, since the cost
of crystal methamphetamine from Mexico far exceeds the cost of domestically produced metham-
phetamine, see Zemike, supra, the inflated price will likely deter some people from becoming
addicted in the first place.
11. Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th
Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rogelio Guevara, Chief of Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration), available at http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct07l803.htm.
12. McNulty, supra note 1. Methamphetamine manufacturers typically use many of the
following chemicals and equipment: sodium hydroxide (lye, commercially available as drain
cleaner), water, ether (starter fluid), denatured ethanol (commercially available in hardware stores),
methanol ("HEET," a gas line antifreeze), isopropyl alcohol (rubbing alcohol), sulfuric acid (battery
acid), rock salt, tin foil, muriatic acid (concrete cleaner), coffee filters, and glass jars and flasks.
Kurt Short, Red Phosphorus Methamphetamine Labs, http://www.okienarc.org/RedPlabs.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2007); see also Roger A. Ely & Diane C. McGrath, Lithium-Ammonia Reduction of
Ephedrine to Methamphetamine: An Unusual Clandestine Synthesis, 35 J. FORENSIC Sci. 720, 721
(1990); Harry F. Skinner, Methamphetamine Synthesis Via Hydriodic Acid/Red Phosphorus Reduc-
tion of Ephedrine, 48 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 123, 123-24 (1990).
13. Regardless of the method, many of the reagents, catalysts, and solvents required to pro-
duce methamphetamine are themselves toxic, and the reaction process releases toxic byproducts.
Moreover, the high risk of explosion at small, clandestine laboratories increases the risk that these
toxic chemicals will be released into the surrounding environment. See Lisa Scanga, Drug Problem:
Environmental Solution, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 152-58 (2005); Anna S. Vogt, Comment, The
Mess Left Behind: Regulating the Cleanup of Former Methamphetamine Laboratories, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 251, 257-65 (2001).
14. This method involves a lithium-ammonia reduction of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine to
methamphetamine. See Ely & McGrath, supra note 12, at 720-23. Manufacturers obtain the lithium
from lithium batteries, and anhydrous ammonia, a liquid fertilizer, is readily available in agricultural
communities. See Illinois Attorney General, Basic Understanding of Meth, http://
www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/methnet/understandingmeth/basics.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
15. This method involves a reduction of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine
via red phosphorus and hydroiodic acid. See Skinner, supra note 12, at 123-25. Iodine crystals are
readily available through some local co-ops and horse-shoeing suppliers, or manufacturers can make
1575May 2007]
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Both the Birch reduction method and the red phosphorus method require
either ephedrine or pseudoephedrine as an essential precursor: "Ephedrine
and pseudoephedrine are to methamphetamine what flour is to bread-THE
essential ingredient."'' 6 Until recently, ephedrine served as a decongestant
and a weight-control product.'7 Because of ephedrine's adverse side effects,
however, pseudoephedrine and phenylephrine have mostly replaced it as a
decongestant, and the FDA has severely restricted its use as a weight-control
product." With the increasingly limited availability of ephedrine, metham-
phetamine manufacturers have turned to pseudoephedrine, the active
ingredient in many common cold medicines.'9 Pseudoephedrine has become
"methamphetamine's most important precursor,"20 with methamphetamine
recipes sometimes calling for between 1000 and 1200 sixty-milligram tab-
lets of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine. 2' Smaller batches,
22
obviously, require less pseudoephedrine.
The overwhelming majority of states have responded to pseudoephed-
rine's central role in manufacturing methamphetamine by passing laws that
restrict the sale of pseudoephedrine products. 3 Oklahoma was the first state
to restrict access to pseudoephedrine, and the results were dramatic: the first
month the law was in force, Oklahoma experienced a forty-five percent re-
duction in the number of methamphetamine laboratories seized by law
them by combining tincture of iodine with hydrogen peroxide. See Short, supra note 12. Manufac-
turers can obtain red phosphorus from the striker plates of match books or from road flares. Id.
16. Illinois Attorney General, supra note 14. For both the Birch reduction method and the
red phosphorus method, manufacturers must isolate the ephedrine or pseudoephedrine from the
tablets in which it is obtained, so both methods begin with an extraction step. Both methods also
have similar steps at the end of the reaction process, when the product is converted to a base, ex-
tracted, and finally precipitated to its hydrochloride salt. See Short, supra note 12; see also Ely &
McGrath, supra note 12, at 721; Skinner, supra note 12, at 123-24.
17. See Iliana Limon, A Lid on Cooks, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., June 23, 2003, at A4.
18. See id.; see also Press Release, FDA, FDA Acts to Remove Ephedra-Containing Dietary
Supplements From Market (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/
NEW01 140.html.
19. Michael Johnsen, Chains move pseudoephedrine behind the counter-but at what cost?,
DRUG STORE NEWS, June 6, 2005, at 39 (noting that Claritin D, Theraflu, Sudafed, Tylenol Sinus,
Tylenol Cold, and Alka Seltzer Plus all contain pseudoephedrine). Children's remedies, gel-caps,
and liquid formulas containing pseudoephedrine, though, are not generally used in methampheta-
mine synthesis. See Matthew Hathaway, Meth market change is expected, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, July 14, 2005, at Dl. Also, phenylephrine has begun to replace pseudoephedrine as a
decongestant, since decongestants containing phenylephrine do not face any of the purchasing re-
strictions described infra.
20. Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Rogelio Guevara).
21. State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (Iowa 2004) ("The most common recipe for
manufacturing meth calls for 1000 to 1200 60-milligram tablets of cold medication containing
pseudoephedrine. This amount of pseudoephedrine generally produces between one to two ounces
of meth.").
22. See Hathaway, supra note 19; cf. State v. Morgan, No. 33568-9-11, 2006 Wash. App.
LEXIS 1326, at *5 (Ct. App. June 27, 2006) ("[Tlhe baggie contained approximately 420 pills, and
... there was enough pseudoephedrine to manufacture 12 grams of methamphetamine.").
23. Ryan Lenz, Anti-Meth Laws Pose Dilemma for States, http://www.officer.comarticle/
article.jsp?siteSection=6&id=26363 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
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enforcement." Oklahoma's law requires that pseudoephedrine products "be
dispensed, sold, or distributed only by, or under the supervision of, a li-
censed pharmacist or a registered pharmacy technician.,,2' Any person
attempting to purchase pseudoephedrine products must produce photo iden-
tification and sign a log. 26 Recently, the Oklahoma legislature amended the
law to implement a real-time electronic logbook to help retailers coordinate
the monitoring of pseudoephedrine sales. 7 The law prohibits a person with-
out a valid prescription from acquiring more than nine grams of
pseudoephedrine-approximately three boxes of cold medicine containing
28ninety-six thirty-milligram tablets per box-within a thirty-day period .
Finally, Oklahoma makes "possession of a drug product containing more
than nine (9) grams of... pseudoephedrine ... a rebuttable presumption of
the intent to use the product as a precursor to methamphetamine ....
Other states' restrictions vary considerably. 3° They usually contain a
combination of the following: setting a limit on the quantity of pseu-
doephedrine that a retailer may sell to a customer within a specified time
period;3' requiring retailers to move pseudoephedrine products behind the
pharmacy counter or within a locked case; 32 requiring retailers to monitor
pseudoephedrine products visually or with electronic surveillance; 3  requir-
ing pseudoephedrine purchasers to produce identification; 34 requiring
retailers or purchasers to record pseudoephedrine purchases on a written or
24. ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings: A Closer Look, Medicine or Meth? (ABC
television broadcast Apr. 28, 2005).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-212(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 2007).
26. Id. § 2-212(A)(2)(b) (requiring each entry on the log to show: (1) the date of the transac-
tion; (2) the name of the purchaser; (3) the driver's license number and state of residence of the
purchaser; (4) the name of the pharmacist or pharmacy technician conducting the transaction; (5) the
product being sold; and (6) the total quantity of pseudoephedrine purchased).
27. Id. § 2-309C.
28. Id. § 2-212(A)(2). Assuming thirty milligrams of pseudoephedrine per tablet and ninety-
six tablets per box, each box contains roughly 2.9 grams of pseudoephedrine. One adult dose is
typically sixty milligrams.
29. Id. § 2-332(B). The statute exempts retailers, other entities, and people typically and
legitimately in possession of greater than nine grams of pseudoephedrine. Id.
30. See Johnsen, supra note 19. Some states have amended previously enacted restrictions to
adjust to the growing methamphetamine epidemic. See, e.g., S.B. 10, 93rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2005) (signed into law on June 15, 2005).
31. See, e.g., IND. CODE §35-48-4-14.7(c)(2) (Supp. 2006); MICH. Comp. LAWS
§ 333.17766f (Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.43.110 (Supp. 2007). Most states set the limit at
either two or three boxes of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine, assuming slightly under
three grams of pseudoephedrine per box.
32. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-14.7(c)(4)(A); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17766e(l)(a)-
(b). This requirement simultaneously serves the purpose of monitoring pseudoephedrine purchases
and preventing theft of pseudoephedrine by methamphetamine manufacturers looking for a rela-
tively easy evasion of the new laws.
33. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-14.7(c)(4)(B); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.17766e(l)(c);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.43.160(l)(a).
34. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-14.7(c)(3)(A); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.17766e(3)(a).
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electronic log; 35 requiring retailers to report suspicious purchases to law en-
forcement; 36 and requiring retailers to report unusual thefts to law
enforcement.3' In addition, state and federal laws prohibit possession of
pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. 5 Some
states have even criminalized possession of more than a specified limit of
pseudoephedrine, 39 and other states have made possession of more than a
specified amount of pseudoephedrine prima facie evidence of intent to
manufacture methamphetamine. 4° These restrictions sometimes exempt
pseudoephedrine products not readily convertible to methamphetamine4
Finally, some states have responded to privacy concerns by explicitly pro-
hibiting retailers from disclosing purchase logs to anyone except law
enforcement. 2
Retailers have played a major role in monitoring pseudoephedrine pur-
chases. In many communities, retailers coordinate with law enforcement and
report suspicious purchases to law enforcement officials.4' Recently, manyretailers, including Walgreens, Target, and CVS, moved beyond voluntary
35. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-14.7(c)(3)(B)-(C); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17766e(3)(b).
36. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-14.7(f).
37. See, e.g., id. § 35-48-4-1 4 .7(g).
38. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1) (2000) (assigning criminal penalties to "[alny person
who knowingly or intentionally ... possesses a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a con-
trolled substance"). Pseudoephedrine is a "listed chemical" as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 802(34). At
the state level, see IowA CODE § 124.401(4) (Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401c(b); Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 195.246, 195.235 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.440. In response to the
Iowa Supreme Court's decision in State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa 2004), the Iowa legisla-
ture recently altered language in § 124.401(4) from "intent to use the product to manufacture any
controlled substance" to "intent that the product be used to manufacture any controlled substance."
2004 Iowa Legis. Serv. 218-19 (West). This distinction is crucial because the former statute, as
interpreted in Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d at 618, provided a loophole to methamphetamine manufactur-
ers who hired other people to obtain pseudoephedrine (often in exchange for a portion of the final
product). The former statute exempted the hired purchasers from criminal liability. Id. At least one
state requires possession of two chemical precursors for criminal liability to arise. See IND. CODE
§ 35-48-4-14.5(e)(2).
39. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-48-4-04.5(b) (criminalizing possession of more than ten grams
of pseudoephedrine); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.17766c (criminalizing the possession of more than
twelve grams of pseudoephedrine); WASH. REv. CODE § 69.43.120 (criminalizing possession of
more than fifteen grams of pseudoephedrine); 2005 Or. Laws 1992 (criminalizing possession of
more than nine grams of pseudoephedrine, while providing for a household exception of twenty-
four grams if not purchased within a period of seven consecutive days).
40. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-313(2)(c)(ii) (West 2006); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 195.246, 195.235.
41. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.17766e(4)(b)-(c).
42. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 333.17766e(3)(b).
43. See Heather Donahoe, Meth law slowing 'cooks,' police say, LEAF-CHRON. (Clarksville,
Tenn.), Mar. 15, 2006, at Al. One example of a retailer coordination effort is Meth Watch, a
program that began in Kansas and has recently been introduced in other states to counter the spread
of small, clandestine laboratories. Meth Watch, The Meth Watch Program, http://
www.methwatch.com/MethWatch-Program/what ismethwatchindex.aspx (last visited Mar. 1,
2007). The Meth Watch program combines community education with retailer coordination. See
Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the H. Comm on Gov't Reform, 108th
Cong. 65-66 (2004) (statement of Steve Bundy, Sheriff, Rice County, Kansas).
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restrictions on pseudoephedrine sales and placed pseudoephedrine products
behind pharmacy counters--even in states where retailers were not required
to do so."4 Target is also developing an electronic log to help track purchases
of pseudoephedrine. 4
In response to the success of the myriad state laws and retailer policies,
the federal government has also begun to regulate pseudoephedrine sales
nationwide. In early 2006, the President signed the Combat Methampheta-
46mine Epidemic Act of 2005 ("CMEA") into law at the federal level.
Notably, the CMEA does not preempt state regulation of pseudoephedrine
sales, leaving states free to maintain or enact more stringent restrictions.47
As of September 30, 2006, the CMEA requires retailers to place pseu-
doephedrine products "such that customers do not have direct access to the
product before the sale is made., 8 To purchase pseudoephedrine, a customer
must provide photo identification and sign a written or electronic log.49 Law
enforcement officials have access to these logs, but the CMEA requires the
attorney general to establish regulations protecting the privacy of individuals
who sign them' ° A store may only sell up to 3.6 grams of pseudoephed-
rine-slightly more than one ninety-six-pill box of cold medicine-per day
to a given purchaser, regardless of the number of transactions.5 ' The CMEA
also prohibits customers from purchasing more than nine grams of pseu-
doephedrine within a thirty-day period 2
Methamphetamine manufacturers thus face a number of restrictions on
their ability to purchase pseudoephedrine. As a result, they have developed
purchasing strategies to obtain the requisite amount of pseudoephedrine for
manufacturing methamphetamine. Part III addresses these strategies in de-
tail, but first, Part II briefly examines the Fourth Amendment's reasonable
suspicion standard and its interplay with outward innocence.
44. See Martiga Lohn, Target to Restrict Medicines Used to Make Meth, http://
www.karel l.com/news/newsarticle.aspx?storyid=90392 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007); Walgreen Puts
Pseudoephedrine Behind Counters, REUTERS, Aug. 5, 2005, available at http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,164894,00.html. For instance, in 1997, Wal-Mart implemented a
voluntary sales limitation policy for pseudoephedrine products, and its cash registers now prompt
cashiers and print out a small information slip when a customer attempts to exceed a purchase limit.
See Wal-Mart Facts, Key Topics: Merchandising, http://www.walmartfacts.com/
articles/2364.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
45. See Lohn, supra note 44.
46. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 701-56, 120
Stat. 256 (2006).
47. Id. § 711(g) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 802); see also Note, supra note 5, at
2519.
48. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act § 711 (b) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
830(e)(l)(A)(i)).
49. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(iv)(I)).
50. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(C)).
51. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 830(d)(1)).
52. Id. § 711(e) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 844(a)).
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II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN OUTWARD INNOCENCE
AND REASONABLE SUSPICION
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court relied upon the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures" to develop the
standard of reasonable suspicion for police officers making a limited inves-
tigatory stop short of an arrest.- These investigatory stops, also known as
Terry stops, differ "from full-fledged arrests requiring probable cause on the
one hand and no-seizure police encounters requiring no justification what-
soever on the other."55 At one end of the spectrum, arrests require probable
cause; at the other end, no-seizure police encounters require no justifica-
516tion. In the middle are investigatory stops, more limited intrusions
requiring reasonable suspicion-a lesser degree of suspicion than the prob-
able cause that arrests require.57 As the Court announced in Terry, "in
justifying [this] particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.""
The concept of outward innocence arises in two distinct ways in apply-
ing the reasonable suspicion standard. First, for a given fact pattern,
although each specific event, in isolation, often appears outwardly innocent,
the fact pattern as a whole may still meet the threshold for reasonable suspi-
cion. The facts in Terry fit this description:
[Officer McFadden] observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series
of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself but which taken together
warranted further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men
standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is
there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up
and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made
to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men
hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of
which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or any-
thing; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing
to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each comple-
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
54. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968).
55. JEROLD H. ISRAEL, YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 214 (2005 ed.).
56. See id. at 214-23.
57. See id.
58. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In justifying the stop, "an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is
insufficient." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Nev-
ertheless, "the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract." Id.
1580 [Vol. 105:1573
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tion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two
men on the comer; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a
third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the
third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away.59
In subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of the "totality of the circumstances" 6 and rejected a "divide-and-
conquer ' 6' analysis. For instance, in United States v. Sokolow, 62 the Court
recognized that "[a]ny one of the[] factors [observed by the police] is not by
itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent
[conduct]. But ... taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. 63
Even more pointedly, in United States v. Arvizu, the Court held:
The [lower] court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in
isolation from each other does not take into account the "totality of the cir-
cumstances," as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared
to believe that each observation by [the law enforcement agent] that was
by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to "no
weight." Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analy-
sis .... Although each of the series of acts [in Terry] was "perhaps
innocent in itself," we held that, taken together, they "warranted further in-
vestigation."
As the Ninth Circuit later summarized, "[wihile some of the factors... may,
when viewed in isolation, be innocently explainable, when viewed in their
totality, they create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
65
The second interplay of outward innocence with reasonable suspicion
deals with the central question in any reasonable suspicion calculus:
whether the totality of the circumstances meets the reasonable suspicion
threshold. Even if a sequence of events as a whole is susceptible to a poten-
tially innocent explanation, reasonable suspicion may still result: "A
determination that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the pos-
sibility of innocent conduct" 66 The sequence of events does not have to be
per se illegal. "The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities, 67 and because investigatory stops are a limited intrusion, rea-
sonable suspicion is a relatively low standard to meet-a law enforcement
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
60. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) ("[T]he essence ... is that the
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account. Based upon that
whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.").
61. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
62. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
63. Sokolow, 490 U.S at 9 (emphasis added).
64. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citations omitted).
65. United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
67. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
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official does not have to be certain beyond a reasonable doubt, or even cer-
tain enough to meet the standard for probable cause, that criminal activity is
68
occurring. As the Court recognized in Sokolow, "there could, of course, be
circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot .... [Tihe relevant inquiry is not whether
particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts."69
In determining whether the totality of the circumstances merits reason-
able suspicion, "officers ... draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative in-
formation available to them that might well elude an untrained person."70
Experience and specialized training are not a blank check, though. As the
Eighth Circuit has explained, "[t]he Fourth Amendment ... requires police
to explain why the officer's knowledge of particular criminal practices gives
special significance to the apparently innocent facts observed."71 If law en-
forcement officials determine that the totality of the circumstances meets the
threshold for reasonable suspicion, then they must be able to explain why,
and they must be able to advance "specific and articulable facts" supportingS 71
such an explanation.
The facts leading up to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Fed-
eral Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, illustrate the interplay between
suspicion-whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause-and outward
innocence. The bombers, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, began by
purchasing 4000 pounds of ammonium nitrate, a common agricultural fertil-
izer, from a cooperative in Kansas. 73 Then, they obtained blasting caps and
74
seven cases of Tovex explosives from a local rock quarry. Finally, they
purchased three drums of nitromethane from a race track near Dallas and
rented several storage lockers in Kansas in which to store the collected ma-
terials. 75 In isolation, each of these facts-purchasing ammonium nitrate,
68. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ("[Tihe level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously
less demanding than that for probable cause." (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 541,544 (1985))).
69. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted). One problem with the reasonable suspicion standard is
that law enforcement officials maintain considerable discretion and sometimes use this discretion to
engage in racial profiling or other unsavory behavior. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651
(2002) (examining racial profiling by the Maryland State Police during their drug interdiction ef-
forts). This is always a concern, however, where law enforcement officials have some amount of
discretion.
70. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted).
71. United States v. Logan, 362 F.3d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
72. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
73. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998).
74. Id. In actuality, McVeigh and Nichols stole the blasting caps and explosives. Admittedly,
stealing these materials from the rock quarry would, by itself, exceed the threshold for reasonable
suspicion and even probable cause. Nevertheless, for the purposes of illustrating the interplay be-
tween suspicion and outward innocence, this Note omits these facts from the textual discussion.
75. Id.
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obtaining explosives from a quarry, purchasing nitromethane, and renting
several storage lockers-might have an innocent explanation, or at the very
least would not lead immediately to the conclusion that McVeigh and
Nichols were planning a horrific act of domestic terrorism. Upon consider-
ing the totality of the circumstances, however, a complete picture emerges,
and the whole becomes many times greater than the sum of its parts.76 The
ammonium nitrate, the explosives from the quarry, and the nitromethane,
each innocently explainable as a separate item, together form the constituent
elements of a powerful explosive device. By collecting these materials and
storing them together, McVeigh and Nichols betrayed that they were acting
in concert to build a bomb. If any trained law enforcement officials had been
aware of these efforts, they could have explained exactly why the totality of
McVeigh's and Nichols' actions justified a high level of suspicion.
The interplay of suspicion and outward innocence is not confined to
such obvious examples as the Oklahoma City bombing." Most investigatory
stops involve situations that are far less obvious and have far less potential
for widespread harm than a terrorist bombing. In these situations, a finding
of reasonable suspicion continues to depend upon whether the given fact
pattern, considered in totality, creates the degree of suspicion that warrants
the limited intrusion of an investigatory stop. In Part III, this Note analyzes
one such situation: the purchase of cold medicine containing pseudoephed-
rine by potential methamphetamine manufacturers.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING REASONABLE SUSPICION
OF PSEUDOEPHEDRINE PURCHASES
The vast majority of pseudoephedrine purchases do not-and should
not-justify an investigatory stop. State legislatures, retailers, and, recently,
76. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S 1, 9-10 (1989); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411,418 (1981).
77. Indeed, the facts of the Oklahoma City bombing were so probative of criminal conduct
that if law enforcement officials had been aware of them, they would almost certainly have had
probable cause to arrest McVeigh and Nichols. This Note deals with reasonable suspicion, a lower
level of suspicion justifying a more limited intrusion than an outright arrest. A determination of
probable cause, like reasonable suspicion, also requires a review of the totality of the circumstances,
see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983), but probable cause requires a higher level of
suspicion because an arrest is a more invasive intrusion.
78. The potential degree of harm affects the reasonable suspicion calculus, as the Seventh
Circuit has concisely stated:
To begin with, the amount of permissible intrusion is a function not only of the likelihood of
turning up contraband or evidence of crime but also of the gravity of the crime being investi-
gated. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court remarked that "the Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart
an imminent terrorist attack." And in Florida v. J.L, it said that "we do not say, for example,
that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a
report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk." In
other words, if the crime being investigated is grave enough, the police can stop and frisk
without as much suspicion as would be required in a less serious criminal case.
United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
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the federal government, have established a maximum amount of pseu-
doephedrine that a consumer can purchase within the law. In doing so, these
restrictions imply that the purchase of this amount, without more, is consis-
tent with legitimate consumer activity. Therefore, one person's purchase, by
himself or herself, of the maximum amount of pseudoephedrine permitted at
one store, should not, by itself, give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Some purchases of pseudoephedrine, however, justify reasonable suspi-
cion. A typical batch of methamphetamine calls for approximately sixty
grams of pseudoephedrine-or roughly twenty boxes of cold medicine.79
Prior to the enactment of restrictions on the sale of pseudoephedrine,
methamphetamine manufacturers were able to purchase or steal the required
amount of pseudoephedrine at just one or two stores.0 In response to retailer
policies, state laws, and federal law,s" many methamphetamine manufactur-
ers have been forced to adopt creative purchasing strategies to circumvent
the new restrictions. 2
Methamphetamine manufacturers' pseudoephedrine purchasing strate-
gies arise in an almost infinite number of fact-specific contexts, but the
conduct at issue usually falls into one or both of two specific purchasing
strategies. In the first purchasing strategy, which this Note has designated
the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy, two or more people go to a store, split up,
pretend not to know each other, each purchase the maximum permissible
amount of pseudoephedrine, and meet up outside the store to combine their
purchases. The second purchasing strategy, which this Note has designated
the Multiple-Stores Strategy, describes situations in which at least one per-
son purchases the maximum amount of pseudoephedrine permitted at one
store, then drives to another store or stores and again purchases the maxi-
mum amount of pseudoephedrine. These two strategies are so common that
law enforcement officials colloquially describe them as "smurfing. ' 3
79. See State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (Iowa 2004). This assumes that each box
contains ninety-six thirty-milligram pills, or approximately three grams of pseudoephedrine per box.
Moreover, methamphetamine manufacturers have recently begun making smaller batches. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
80. See Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d at 614-15. In Truesdell, the defendant stole seventy boxes of
pseudoephedrine from one store. Id. At that time, Iowa did not restrict pseudoephedrine sales.
81. See supra Part I.
82. Part l11's analysis only covers the strategies that methamphetamine manufacturers have
utilized when purchasing pseudoephedrine from retail stores. Some domestic methamphetamine
manufacturers have bypassed retail stores altogether, and in such instances, Part Ill's reasonable
suspicion framework is largely moot. For instance, until eBay prohibited the sale of pseudoephed-
rine in late September 2005, many methamphetamine manufacturers could purchase
pseudoephedrine on eBay. See Boaz Herzog, Eflay prohibits sales of meth ingredients on its web
site, OREGONIAN, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
83. One court's definition of "smurfing" is the situation in which "several people separately
purchases [sic] precursor chemicals in order to avoid arousing suspicion." State v. Lillico, No. A03-
961, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852, at *6 (Ct. App. July 20, 2004). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia has provided the other common definition of "smurfing": the
practice by which, "[iun order to obtain large quantities of [pseudoephedrine], criminals shoplift the
tablets from retail stores or, individually and in groups, make multiple purchases of the tablets from
different stores." PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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Under the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 1 these
purchasing strategies should meet the reasonable suspicion threshold to jus-
tify an investigatory stop. Each purchasing strategy consists of constituent
facts that appear outwardly innocent when separated and viewed in isola-
tion. These facts vary depending on the purchasing strategy, but they include
the following: purchasing cold medicine; purchasing the maximum amount
of pseudoephedrine permitted by law; traveling to multiple stores one after
the other; shopping with a companion; pretending not to know a companion
while in the store; meeting in the parking lot; and combining purchases. By
itself, each fact seems innocuous.
Upon considering the totality of the circumstances,85 though, a new pic-
ture emerges. For either the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy or the Multiple-
Stores Strategy, the constituent facts-while outwardly innocent in isola-
tion-combine to form a totality of the circumstances that meets the
threshold for reasonable suspicion. Moreover, an experienced law enforce-
ment official could articulate exactly why: pseudoephedrine is an essential
ingredient for methamphetamine manufacturers; each batch of metham-
phetamine requires a relatively large quantity of pseudoephedrine; retailers,
state legislatures, and the federal government regulate pseudoephedrine
sales to prevent methamphetamine manufacturers from stockpiling pseu-
doephedrine; and, most importantly, methamphetamine manufacturers use
these purchasing strategies to circumvent pseudoephedrine restrictions and
obtain inordinately large quantities of pseudoephedrine. The Washington
Court of Appeals provides an excellent illustration in State v. Morgan:
At the suppression hearing, [the detective] explained ... that when two
men, shopping separately, purchase cold medicine, without buying any-
thing else, and then get into the same vehicle, it made [the investigation
unit] suspicious. This method of purchasing separately allows them to get
more pills than one person could because state law limits a buyer to three
packages a day and some stores, like Target, allow only two packages per
person per day.
When Dugan next went to Walgreens and there Morgan bought more cold
medicine, the officers suspected that Dugan and Morgan were on a "pill
run," which is a way of obtaining large quantities of pseudoephedrine by
stopping at multiple stores to avoid the three package limit.8
Unfortunately, some courts have refused to hold that the identification of
one of these purchasing strategies provides law enforcement officials with
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Section III.A addresses the
more controversial of the two purchasing strategies, the Multiple-Purchasers
Strategy. It argues, in the face of conflicting authority, that a properly identi-
84. See supra Part 11.
85. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).




fled Multiple-Purchasers Strategy, by itself, justifies an investigatory stop
under the Supreme Court's reasonable suspicion standard. Section III.B then
argues that a Multiple-Stores Strategy, by itself, also meets the reasonable
suspicion threshold. Finally, Section III.C explains that, most of the time,
methamphetamine manufacturers will utilize the two purchasing strategies
in conjunction with each other-as a hybrid strategy--or alongside the pur-
chase of other methamphetamine precursors. These factors strengthen the
case for reasonable suspicion, but as Sections III.A and 11.B argue, a bare-
bones Multiple-Purchasers Strategy or Multiple-Stores Strategy is still
enough to merit reasonable suspicion.
A. The Multiple-Purchasers Strategy
Several courts have correctly recognized that a Multiple-Purchasers
Strategy is reasonably suspicious. These cases provide considerable support
for the proposition that a properly identified Multiple-Purchasers Strategy
meets the reasonable suspicion threshold for an investigatory stop. The lead-
ing federal case on reasonable suspicion of pseudoephedrine purchases is
87the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ameling, which found rea-
sonable suspicion in the face of a predominant Multiple-Purchasers
Strategy. In Ameling, the two defendants entered a Target store in Fort
Dodge, Iowa.s8 As Mike Van Pelt, the store's lead security officer, monitored
them via video surveillance, the defendants walked together to the pseu-
doephedrine products, and each of them selected two boxes of
pseudoephedrine.8 9 The defendants then walked toward the checkout lanes,
split up, and went to different cashiers. 90 After paying for their pseudoephed-
rine, they reunited in the parking lot, where they placed their Target bags in
a tool box in the back of a truck.9' Van Pelt next observed the defendants
92drive across the street to a Hy-Vee store. Van Pelt knew that "people in-
volved in [methamphetamine] manufacturing often split purchases of
pseudoephedrine or other necessary supplies among themselves and differ-
ent stores to avoid attracting suspicion," so he called the police.93 When the
police called the Hy-Vee store, a Hy-Vee employee informed them that the
defendants had purchased a lithium battery, which is another methampheta-
87. 328 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2003).




92. Id. The defendants' conduct is also somewhat consistent with a Multiple-Stores Strategy,
but the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy predominates. Section I.C, infra, discusses such hybrid
strategies.
93. Id. Van Pelt had previously "completed a training course given by the Fort Dodge police
department where he had been taught that pseudoephedrine was used to manufacture metham-
phetamine illegally." Id.
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mine precursor.94 Shortly thereafter, the police stopped the defendants." The
Eighth Circuit held that the police had reasonable suspicion to do so, since
"the defendants' actions were consistent with those of methamphetamine
manufacturers trying to disguise their illegal operations. 96
Similarly, in United States v. Huegli,97 the Western District of Wisconsin
held that a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy was reasonably suspicious. In Hue-
gli, a loss prevention officer noticed two men enter a Shopko store.98 They
appeared to be working in tandem.99 The younger man went to the over-the-
counter drug section, looked around, and then walked around the perimeter
of the store without selecting any merchandise.'O° He returned to the over-
the-counter drug section, where he joined the older man.0 ° Within a few
seconds of each other, each man picked out two boxes of pseudoephedrine,
and the older man went to the front of the store.10 2 The younger man contin-
ued to walk the perimeter of the store for ten minutes and eventually
checked out, purchasing nasal spray and a can of pop in addition to the
pseudoephedrine.' 3 Continuing his surveillance of the two men, the loss
prevention officer noticed them get into the same truck, after which they
opened their packages of pseudoephedrine and placed the contents in a
bag.' ° The loss prevention officer also noticed that the truck was from Iowa,
a state with a severe methamphetamine problem.' ° 5 Eventually, the truck left
the Shopko parking lot and pulled into the parking lot of an adjacent Cub
grocery store.' °6 The loss prevention officer notified the police department,
and the police stopped the two men.' °7 In holding that the police had the rea-
sonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the district court explained
that the actions of the men, "as reported to the police by [the loss prevention
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 448.
97. No. 05-CR-060-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825 (W.D. Wis. July 21, 2005), aff'd, No.
05-CR-060-S-01, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16082 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 3, 2005).
98. Huegli, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14825, at * 1.
99. Id. at *1-2.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id. Two boxes of pseudoephedrine were the maximum that Shopko allowed its customers
to purchase. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *2-3. The loss prevention officer also said he believed they ingested some sort of
substance while in the truck. Id. at *3.
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3-4.
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officer], so closely followed the meth-cooker's shopping [modus operandi]
as to verge on probable cause. ..,.10'
State courts have also found reasonable suspicion from Multiple-
Purchasers Strategies. In State v. Nebergall,"'° a clerk at an Iowa conven-
ience store observed a vehicle pull into the empty parking lot and park in a
"dark spot" some distance away from the lighted front entrance to the
store."0 After approximately five minutes, two men emerged from the vehi-
cle. " The two men split up upon entering the store and pretended not to
know each other. 12 One immediately walked to the register and bought ciga-
rettes and two bottles of pseudoephedrine."' The other, after walking to the
back of the store, returned to the front of the store and bought two bottles of
pseudoephedrine after the first man had completed his purchase."4 The two
men returned to the vehicle and moved it to a different dark area of the park-
ing lot, after which a female exited the vehicle, entered the store, and
purchased two bottles of pseudoephedrine."' The Iowa Court of Appeals
held that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car:
Although the mere purchase of two bottles of pseudoephedrine by multi-
ple, associated persons may arguably be a seemingly innocent activity,
when combined with other facts and circumstances surrounding the multi-
ple purchases involved here we find the detaining officer had reasonable
grounds to suspect wrongdoing and was justified in conducting an investi-
gatory stop to resolve any ambiguity as to whether criminal activity was
afoot.'16
Three decisions from Minnesota have also recognized that a Multiple-
Purchasers Strategy is reasonably suspicious. In State v. Vereb,"7 a Wal-Mart
employee notified the police that two men had made several trips into the
store to purchase a large quantity of pseudoephedrine.' '8 The police stopped
the two men, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals subsequently held that the
108. Id. at *16-17. The court then described the modus operandi in detail: "two men from
Iowa come to Wisconsin, drive to a generic big-box store on the edge of town, enter separately,
mosey aimlessly, purchase the store's limit on pseudoephedrine, dump the pills into a communal bag
in their truck, ingest some sort of substance, and then drive to the adjacent grocery store, most likely
to buy more cold tablets." Id. at *17.
109. No. 3-864/03-0472, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 1122 (Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003).
110. Nebergall, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 1122, at *2. The clerk testified that he was watching
the car closely because no one emerged from the car for approximately five minutes and he feared




114. Id. at *2-3.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id. at * 13-15.
117. 643 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
118. Vereb, 643 N.W.2d at 345.
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police had reasonable suspicion to do so." 9 In State v. Lillico,120 two citizen
informants observed three people in a Kmart collectively purchase eight
packages of pseudoephedrine and some Coleman lantern fuel. 2 While in
Kmart, the three of them appeared to ignore each other, but they reunited in
the parking lot and exchanged money.22 Citing Vereb, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals held that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop them. '2' Fi-
nally, in Forbrook v. State,'24 a loss prevention officer at a Target store
informed the police that two men "had entered the store together, but there-
after split up; each had purchased two boxes of pseudoephedrine, a known
precursor material in methamphetamine manufacture; and they were joined
in the parking lot by a third man, who had also purchased pseudoephed-
rine."'' 25 The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that this conduct provided the
police with reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.126
At least two courts faced with a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy, however,
have declined to find reasonable suspicion. First, in State v. Bulington,'27 the
Indiana Supreme Court held that, under the Indiana Constitution's analogue
to the Fourth Amendment,12 a textbook two-person Multiple-Purchasers
Strategy did not provide the reasonable suspicion that would justify an in-
vestigatory stop. 29 The two defendants in Bulington entered a Meijer
together. Each selected three boxes of pseudoephedrine, proceeded to sepa-
rate checkout counters, walked out of the store separately, reunited at the
same truck, and emptied the contents of their purchases into the same
bags. 30 In refusing to hold that the police had reasonable suspicion, the
119. See id. at 347. The court also observed that when the police officer attempted to follow
the vehicle, it began traveling at excessive speeds. Id. While this does not appear to have been cen-
tral to the court's holding, traveling at excessive speeds is justification for a stop regardless of
whether other facts merit reasonable suspicion. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996).
120. A03-961, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852 (Ct. App. July 20, 2004).
121. Lillico, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852, at *3.
122. Id. In addition, they were all traveling in a car with no license plates, "a common tactic
in methamphetamine cases." Id.
123. Id. at *4-5.
124. A05-678, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 424 (Ct. App. May 2, 2006).
125. Forbrook, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 424, at *2.
126. Id. at *4. The court also noted the "nervous" behavior of the defendant, but that occurred
only after the initial stop. Id. at *3.
127. 802 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 2004) (3-2 decision).
128. IND. CONST. art. I, § 11. The court noted that "[a]lthough art. I, § 11, of the Indiana Consti-
tution appears to have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and shares the same language, we
interpret and apply art. I, § 11, independently from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Bulington, 802
N.E.2d at 438. The court did not address the claim under the Fourth Amendment, but its analysis of
the investigatory stop at issue is still relevant for the purposes of this Note.
129. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d at 436, 441-42. The dissent emphatically disagreed, arguing that
"the police had a moral certainty, not just reasonable suspicion, that they had some unregulated
pharmaceutical manufacturers on their hands." Id. at 442 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 436.
May 20071 1589
Michigan Law Review
court concluded that courts in other jurisdictions have found reasonable sus-
picion only
when the customer (1) purchases a combination of methamphetamine pre-
cursors from one store; (2) purchases a combination of precursors from
several stores; (3) purchases ... one precursor and then commits a traffic
violation warranting a traffic stop; and (4) purchases one precursor and the
arresting officer has knowledge of defendant's previous involvement with
methamphetamine.' 3
Second, in State v. Schneider, a Kansas Court of Appeals similarly re-
fused to find reasonable suspicion in a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy.'12 In
Schneider, two men were talking in the cold-pill aisle as they each picked
out two packages of cold tablets containing pseudoephedrine.'33 "One of the
males waited outside in a truck after he purchased two packages of cold tab-
lets, while the second male walked around the store and purchased some
toys, football cards, and shampoo in addition to the two packages of cold
tablets."14 Eventually, the second man got into the truck with the first man,
and they left the parking lot. 3' Referring to the prosecution's reasonable
suspicion argument as "'a little scary,'" the court held that the police did not
have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants. 136
The driving force behind the Bulington and Schneider courts' misplaced
resistance to finding reasonable suspicion in a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy
appears to be the "he was only buying cold medicine" defense. Such a de-
fense has a visceral appeal for the vast majority of people who have
themselves purchased cold medicine and believe--correctly-that their own
innocuous purchases should not justify an investigatory stop. This is readily
apparent in the Bulington court's oversimplified argument that "[t]he oppor-
tunities for official arbitrariness, discretion, and discrimination are simply too
great if we were to find that the purchase by two companions of three pack-
ages each of cold medicine justifies a search or seizure."' 3 7 The Schneider
court's language is even starker and even more of an oversimplification:
"[T]his court has never held that the mere purchase and possession of two
packages of cold pills containing pseudoephedrine is sufficient evidence to
infer criminal intent. We agree with the district court in finding the State's
position 'a little scary.' ,,38
The Bulington and Schneider courts' reactions may stem from fears of
exposing perfectly legal purchases to frighteningly invasive costs. Unfortu-
131. Id. at 441 (footnotes omitted). A traffic violation would automatically warrant a stop,
however, with or without pseudoephedrine purchases. See supra note 119.
132. 80 P.3d 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
133. Schneider, 80 P.3d at 1186.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1189.
137. State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435,440 (Ind. 2004) (footnote omitted).
138. Schneider, 80 P.3d at 1189.
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nately, decisions like the Mississippi Supreme Court's in Burchfield v.
State'39 give some credence to that concern. In Burchfield, the court found
that "two white males in a Cadillac with Arkansas license plates had each
purchased a quantity of pills containing pseudoephedrine[,] ... which justi-
fied an investigatory stop.', 40 The Mississippi Supreme Court's explanation
is dubious. The court neither provided additional information about the con-
text of the purchase nor adequately explained why the totality of the
circumstances justified reasonable suspicion. 4 ' The court's cursory descrip-
tion would encompass far too many innocent people to justify reasonable
suspicion, including many people who are not trying to circumvent pseu-
doephedrine restrictions.
The overwhelming majority of pseudoephedrine purchases will not-
and should not-justify an investigatory stop. What distinguishes a properly
identified Multiple-Purchasers Strategy, including the factual scenarios in
Bulington and Schneider, is that the totality of the circumstances indicates a
heightened probability of criminal activity. The purchasers in these situa-
tions have coordinated their actions to circumvent the pseudoephedrine
restrictions that were specifically implemented to prevent such purchasers
from obtaining the inordinately large quantities of pseudoephedrine neces-
sary to manufacture methamphetamine. Such deliberate circumvention
decreases the probability that the purchases are innocuous and increases the
probability that the purchasers will use the pseudoephedrine to manufacture
methamphetamine.
Even the Indiana Court of Appeals has implicitly recognized the prob-
lems that the Indiana Supreme Court created in Bulington. In Barrett v.
State, 42 a Meijer loss prevention officer informed police that two people
working in tandem had purchased several boxes of pseudoephedrine'-
essentially the very same facts that were present in Bulington. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals held that the police did have reasonable suspicion to stop
the individuals' car, based upon one additional fact: the car's "passenger-side
tires were on the fog line for thirty to fifty yards."' 44 As the dissent accu-
rately noted, this is a dubious distinction from Bulington'45-and definitely
not an intellectually honest one. Such is the life of a state court of appeals,
however, when the state's highest court has decided that such recurring sus-
picious conduct is not really suspicious at all.
Admittedly, people other than methamphetamine manufacturers may oc-
casionally engage in conduct that resembles a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy.
For example, what if a large family gets a cold simultaneously and needs to
139. 892 So. 2d 191, 195 (Miss. 2004).
140. Burchfield, 892 So. 2d at 195.
141. See id.
142. 837 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
143. Barrett, 837 N.E.2d at 1024.
144. Id. at 1025.
145. Id. at 1031 (Mathias, J., dissenting).
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purchase a larger amount of pseudoephedrine than permitted by law at one
store?' 46 In such a situation, the family, whose intentions are entirely inno-
cent, might engage in a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy to obtain the requisite
amount of pseudoephedrine 4 ' The ultimate question in a reasonable suspi-
cion analysis, however, is the probability that such conduct is innocent and
the degree of suspicion that attaches to the conduct. 48 If the purchases of
pseudoephedrine appear designed to circumvent the restrictions and obtain
inordinately large amounts of pseudoephedrine, then the degree of suspicion
increases and justifies the limited intrusion of an investigatory stop, even if
some likelihood of innocent activity exists. This is the point at which the
limited level of the intrusion becomes particularly salient, since an investi-
gatory stop should quickly verify that the hypothetical family purchased the
pseudoephedrine for innocuous reasons, without subjecting the family to the
indignity that would accompany an arrest.
The manner of detecting suspicious purchases also serves as a buffer
against stopping innocent purchasers. Retail stores provide law enforcement
with most of the information regarding suspicious purchasers.149 Since re-
strictions on pseudoephedrine purchases already hurt pseudoephedrine sales
and limit the choices available to consumers, retailers will be reluctant to
exacerbate the problem and further detract from their business. Any embar-
rassing detention of an innocent purchaser might create a backlash against
the store that reported the purchaser to law enforcement, and retailers will
almost certainly hesitate to report pseudoephedrine purchases if the retailers
believe that the conduct is innocent. A detained customer is an unhappy cus-
tomer.
B. The Multiple-Stores Strategy
Courts have been more willing to hold that a Multiple-Stores Strategy5 '
merits reasonable suspicion than to hold that a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy
146. Inevitably, many methamphetamine manufacturers also claim something along these
lines when stopped by law enforcement officials. See Forbrook v. State, No. A05-678, 2006 Minn.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 424, at *3 (Ct. App. May 2, 2006) ("When asked about his purchase of pseu-
doephedrine, appellant stated that the pills were intended for his mother, who was sick.").
147. They might also engage in a Multiple-Stores Strategy. See infra Section III.B.
148. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S 1, 9-10 (1989).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling, 328 E3d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Donahoe,
supra note 43 (describing how pharmacists work with law enforcement officials and keep an eye on
customers purchasing pseudoephedrine). Critics may respond that this implicates privacy concerns
regarding consumer purchases of pseudoephedrine. Granted, some privacy has given way in the face
of the need to restrict and track certain types of pseudoephedrine purchases. Nonetheless, many state
laws, and the new federal law, attempt to mitigate the intrusion into consumer privacy by prohibiting
anyone other than law enforcement from obtaining logs of purchases from retail stores. See supra
text accompanying notes 42, 50.
150. As explained supra, a Multiple-Stores Strategy occurs when at least one person pur-
chases the maximum amount of pseudoephedrine permitted at one store, then drives to another store
or stores and again purchases the maximum amount of pseudoephedrine.
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does.'"' The Eastern District of Missouri faced a textbook example of the
Multiple-Stores Strategy in United States v. Thurston.5 2 In Thurston, a po-
lice detective observed the defendant purchase two boxes of
pseudoephedrine at Target. 5 3 Recognizing the defendant from a previous
arrest, the detective followed him to Walgreens, where the detective saw him' 54
purchase two more boxes of pseudoephedrine. The court held that the po-
lice had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, even though the four
boxes did not contain enough pseudoephedrine to constitute "prima facie
evidence of intent" to manufacture methamphetamine under Missouri law.'55
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in State v. Heusert56 exem-
plifies how a Multiple-Stores Strategy meets the threshold for reasonable
suspicion in practice. In Heuser, a Target store employee noticed a man and
a woman purchase numerous packages of pseudoephedrine and leave the
parking lot together in a van."' The employee notified the police, who lo-
cated the van at Wal-Mart and observed the woman exit the store with• 158
additional purchases. Then, the couple drove to Walgreens, where the man
purchased several boxes of pseudoephedrine and asked about lithium batter-
ies. ' 59 The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the
couple because their "conduct was consistent with people engaged in the
manufacture of methamphetamine who generally try to avoid suspicion by
gathering cold medication and batteries from a number of stores.
' 6 °
The Mississippi Supreme Court has also held that a Multiple-Stores
Strategy is reasonably suspicious. In Williamson v. State,16 an anonymous
tip informed police that two white males purchased "large quantities" of
pseudoephedrine from a Campbell's Big Star after previously attempting to
151. The Kansas Court of Appeals has even hinted that the Multiple-Stores Strategy might be
more suspicious than the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy, with only the former justifying an investiga-
tory stop. See State v. Poage, 129 P.3d 641, 645 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (distinguishing Schneider
because in Schneider "there were no attempts at multiple purchases, at more than a single store").
152. No. S1-4:02 CR 494 CDP DDN, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14954 (E.D. Mo. May 14,
2003).
153. Thurston, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14954, at *3.
154. Id.
155. ld. at'*8-10.
156. 661 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 2003). A Multiple-Purchasers Strategy and other factors are also
present here, but the court's description focuses mostly on the Multiple-Stores Strategy.
157. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d at 160.
158. Id. The police did not observe what these purchases were. Id.
159. Id. Lithium batteries are another methamphetamine precursor. See supra note 14.
160. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d at 162. The court, however, was careful to note that "[tihis is not a
case where a person possessed only a large amount of cold medicine or only a number of lithium
batteries." Id. Instead, the defendant had "an unusually large number of pills," and the police "had
reasonable cause to suspect [he] also possessed lithium batteries." Id. "These facts, coupled with
[his] suspicious conduct of driving store to store gathering medication and switching-off with his
companion to buy the pills formed a solid basis [for reasonable suspicion]." Id. The court did not
explicitly address whether, in its view, the conduct would have resulted in reasonable suspicion
without the presence of lithium batteries.
161. 876 So. 2d 353 (Miss. 2004).
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purchase pseudoephedrine from a Family Dollar Store.' 62 The men left the
Campbell's Big Star in a white van and proceeded to Fred's Dollar Store,
where police stopped them. Although the court's opinion dealt primarily
with the reliability of the anonymous tip, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that the defendants' Multiple-Stores Strategy provided the police with
reasonable suspicion to stop the van.' 64
These courts have correctly recognized that a properly identified Mul-
tiple-Stores Strategy merits a finding of reasonable suspicion justifying an
investigatory stop. Like the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy described in Sec-
tion III.A, methamphetamine manufacturers use the Multiple-Stores
Strategy to circumvent pseudoephedrine restrictions and obtain the large
quantities of pseudoephedrine required to manufacture methamphetamine.
Thus, to the extent that many of the criticisms levied at the Multiple-
Purchasers Strategy analysis in Section III.A could also be levied at this
Section's Multiple-Stores Strategy analysis, the responses to those criti-
cisms are very similar. 16 For example, the "he was only buying cold
medicine" defense is as equally futile in the Multiple-Stores Strategy con-
text as in the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy context. The totality of the
conduct remains the overarching determinant of reasonable suspicion.66
C. Hybrid Scenarios and Additional Precursors
In Sections III.A and III.B, this Note treated the two purchasing strate-
gies independently and contended that each pseudoephedrine purchasing
strategy alone merits a finding of reasonable suspicion. Admittedly, though,
some of the court decisions detailed above involved hybrids of the two• 67
strategies or contained aggravating circumstances, such as the purchase of16. .•.169
additional methamphetamine precursors,16 a suspicious vehicle, prior ex-
162. Williamson, 876 So. 2d at 354.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 355-56.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 137-149.
166. See supra Part II and Section I.A.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
defendants traveled to two stores to spread out the purchase of methamphetamine precursors);
United States v. Huegli, No. 05-CR-060-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825, at *17 (W.D. Wis. July
21, 2005) (describing how the defendants went to the parking lot of an adjacent grocery store, "most
likely to buy more cold tablets"); State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 2003) (noting that
both defendants went into the first store and purchased numerous packages of pseudoephedrine
before traveling to additional stores); see also supra notes 92, 156.
168. See, e.g., Ameling, 328 F.3d at 448 (describing the purchase of a lithium battery at the
second store); Heuser, 661 N.W.2d at 162 (emphasizing that the defendant possessed both pseu-
doephedrine and lithium batteries); State v. Lillico, No. A03-961, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852, at
*3 (Ct. App. July 20, 2004) (noting that the defendants also purchased Coleman lantern fuel, a
methamphetamine precursor).
169. See, e.g., Huegli, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825, at *3, *17 (noting that the defendants'
vehicle had an Iowa license plate and that it was common for Iowa methamphetamine manufacturers
to come to Wisconsin to purchase precursors); State v. Nebergall, No. 3-864/03-0472, 2003 Iowa
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perience with the suspect,17 or other evasive conduct. Other court deci-
sions have also dealt with hybrids of the two strategies.
7 1
A hybrid strategy increases the degree of suspicion, since it allows pur-
chasers to obtain pseudoephedrine even more quickly and in even greater
quantities than either of the two strategies does individually."' For instance,
in a hypothetical hybrid of the Multiple-Purchasers Strategy and the Multi-
ple-Stores Strategy, two people would go to a store, split up, pretend not to
know each other, each purchase the maximum permissible amount of pseu-
doephedrine, and meet outside the store, after which they would travel to an
additional store or stores and repeat this behavior. This hybrid strategy
would allow them to maximize their purchases of pseudoephedrine. Conse-
quently, the case for reasonable suspicion is even stronger for such a hybrid
strategy than for each strategy individually, 74 although this Note maintains
that each of the purchasing strategies also meets the threshold for reasonable
suspicion individually and justifies an investigatory stop.
Likewise, the purchase of pseudoephedrine alongside additional
methamphetamine precursors-such as lithium batteries, drain cleaner, or
coffee filters-strengthens the case for reasonable suspicion. 75  A
combination of methamphetamine precursors increases the degree of
suspicion by increasing the probability that the purchaser will use them to
manufacture methamphetamine and decreasing the probability that their
App. LEXIS 1122, at *14 (Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003) (describing the vehicle's out-of-county license
plate); Lillico, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852, at *3 (noting that the car had no license plate);
Burchfield v. State, 892 So. 2d 191, 193 (Miss. 2004) (explaining that the car had an Arkansas li-
cense plate).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, No. S14:02 CR 494 CDP DDN, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14954, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2003) (noting that the detective recognized the suspect
from a previous arrest).
171. See, e.g., Nebergall, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 1122, at *14 (describing how the vehicle
parked in a dark area in the parking lot and no one exited the vehicle for five minutes); State v.
Vereb, 643 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the vehicle traveled at "excessive
speeds" when the officer attempted to follow it).
172. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, No. 33568-9-11, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1326, at *1-2 (Ct.
App. June 27, 2006).
173. See State v. Hugo, No. 5-962 / 05-0519, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 253, at * 1-2 (Ct. App.
Mar. 29, 2006) ("On several occasions, one of [the defendants] would enter a store and buy a quan-
tity of the pills after the other had made a similar purchase and had exited. On some occasions the
couple would travel to a different pharmacy on the same day and repeat the process." (footnote
omitted)).
174. Some courts have even come close to holding that such a hybrid strategy provides prob-
able cause for an arrest. See, e.g., People v. Yaklich, No. C049001, 2006 Cal. Unpub. LEXIS 8427,
at *8-13 (Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2006) (holding that a hybrid strategy combined with the purchase of
hydrogen peroxide provided probable cause for an arrest); Morgan, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1326,
at *13-14 (holding that a hybrid strategy, combined with the purchase of two additional precursors,
provided probable cause for an arrest).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Nanos, No. 06-1797, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 30984, at *3 (8th
Cir. Dec. 13, 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion from the simultaneous purchase of pseudoephed-
rine, hydrogen peroxide, and coffee filters, combined with other suspicious behavior); cf. United
States v. Bamhart, No. 04-40168-01/02/03-RDR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33056, at *6-7 (D. Kan.
Dec. 12, 2005) (finding reasonable suspicion from a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy combined with a
purchase of air tubing and an association with a pseudoephedrine shoplifter).
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purchase is innocuous. In many cases, the purchaser obtains these other
precursors alongside pseudoephedrine via a Multiple-Purchasers Strategy or
a Multiple-Stores Strategy. 1 6 Although this Note will not address the
additional precursor wrinkle in further detail, among the factors that could
influence the reasonable suspicion calculus in such scenarios are how many
precursors are purchased, whether the combination of precursors is
commonly purchased together for legitimate use, and how many innocuous
items are purchased alongside the precursors.177 In each case, these factors
affect the totality of the circumstances and the probability that the purchase
is susceptible to an innocent explanation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's totality-of-the-circumstances approach to reason-
able suspicion, as well as the weight of authority considering the issue,
support this Note's conclusion that certain types of pseudoephedrine pur-
chases justify an investigatory stop. Even if "buying cold medicine" itself
sounds innocuous, methamphetamine manufacturers have developed pur-
chasing strategies to transform this outwardly innocent activity into a means
of obtaining inordinately large quantities of pseudoephedrine. Law en-
forcement officials therefore have recourse, under the Fourth Amendment,
for investigating these suspicious purchasing strategies and combating the
methamphetamine epidemic.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003); State v. Heuser,
661 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 2003); State v. Lillico, No. A03-961, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 852, at
*3 (Ct. App. July 20, 2004).
177. The last factor should also influence the reasonable suspicion calculus where pseu-
doephedrine is the only precursor purchased. More innocuous items decrease the amount of
accompanying suspicion. Although methamphetamine manufacturers could try to conceal their
activities by purchasing precursors alongside many innocuous items, they are almost certainly lim-
ited by the cost of this deceptive technique. Every innocuous item purchased alongside the
precursors raises the cost of production for the batch of methamphetamine. Perhaps manufacturers
could mitigate that problem by purchasing precursors alongside innocuous items that the manufac-
turers would otherwise need for legitimate uses. Given the large amount of pseudoephedrine (and
the array of other precursors) needed for a batch of methamphetamine, however, this deceptive
technique is still limited by its cost.
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